Hubris - Initial Thoughts

I'm 150 pages into Isikoff & Corm's book on the run up to the Iraq war, Hubris. On the heels of Woodard's book, differences in style and depth are readily apparent. Hubris is thick with reporting. While I think Woodward's book is a must read for a US policy wonk like me due to his unique access to Administration leadership and the careful sourcing of his reporting, Isikoff and Corn get their hands dirty in the details and it's fascinating. I have some empathy for Isikoff's comments at a press event following the publishing of Woodward's book where he bemoaned all the attention given to State of Denial. Reports had it that Isikoff scoffed at Woodward's book, essentially calling it tired drivel and almost unreadable(he later sought to render those (alcohol-induced?) comments off-the-record with a phone call the next day to no avail).

Based on my reading of Hubris thus far, I have to agree with him. It is a much more detailed account. I'll render a highlight blog on it when I'm done, but q couple of quick hits. In October, 2002 just prior to the vote to authorize force against Iraq, polls showed 52% of Americans supported the notion of going to war against Iraq. I must be developing Alzheimer's, I simply don't recall such a narrow split amongst the populace. It might be that my recollection is influenced by the circles I run in. Morris County, New Jersey bleeds Republican red so there was little doubt regarding the Administration's case for the seriousness of the Iraqi threat. Moreover, my memory also might be dulled because I'm more conscious of the ease with which the authorization passed in Congress. While there was Democratic opposition to the authorization, such opposition was more ceremonial than it was a serious threat. Bully politics - propose divisive, yet often consequential legislation just prior to elections - was effectively utilized to minimize debate and intimidate feckless politicians who stand for little more than job security - their own!

Secondly, Dick Armey, former Congressman from Texas and number two at the time in the House leadership, is apparently a primary source as to the political machinations of the Administration. He is quoted as being deeply troubled regarding his role - effectively silently assenting to an ill-conceived policy constructed upon intel that was far less substantive than the Administration (and the CIA) was leading the public to believe. His mea culpa is that, I should've known better, a position shared by many of the contributors to this book. More to follow.