Managing Expectations

Reinforcements, surge, augmentation, escalation (let's call it "Plan Y"). You say potato I say potato. At the risk of sounding a bit callous, I think a lot about where we sit politically vis a vis Iraqis about the failure to properly manage expectations.

That failure began with the oversell of the threat posed by Iraq and the sacrifice necessary to extinguish that threat. The failure continued by premature declarations of success, firstly, in the contrived photo op of GWB landing on a aircraft carrier that was purposefully kept offshore and the display of Mission Accomplished banner.

The overselling of the political progress within Iraq, whether it was the drone about the progress (or as it should have been non-progress) of the Iraqi military or police forces, the development of an unworkable Iraqi constitution, or an election that displayed little more than the fractiousness of the Iraq body politic are all emblematic of poor politics. The reality simply did not comport with sales job. Accordingly, the American people are rightly suspicious when the latest proposal is proffered as the only possible course of action. At the same time, any disagreement with the Administration's is seen as cowardly.

The Administration has lost credibility with the American people and appropriately so. The American people are not unwilling to fight the good fight, but not a fight that is waged ineffectually and with an absence of candor. Even the current proposal is overly vague with respect to identifiable and quantifiable goals. Progress in Iraq is an identifiable goal and a worthy goal at that, but it is not readily quantifiable and the Bush Administration seems intent on keeping it that way.

The diehard talking heads that continue to support the Administration talk about the
necessity of Plan Y say they believe it will result in progress within 6 to 9 months. While I don't doubt the American military's ability to wage successful campaigns, the progress spoken of requires substantial changes in the way the Iraqi government and military operates. Is that even reasonable to expect within 6 to 9 months. Count me as a skeptic. More troubling is that this timeframe has not been signed onto by the Administration. Incremental improvements in Iraq over the next 6 to 9 months aren't likely result in a substantial change in the support for the efforts in Iraq.

Despite a mature economy that continues to grow at historical strong rates despite very large increases to oil, Bush is seen as a failed President. I think the primary reason is not that Iraq is a mess, but that he and his Administration has not told the American people how hard assisting in the formation of a sustainable, secular Iraq would be. It matters little to the voters whether that is the result of deception or ineptitude, it is a distinction that for the time being, without a difference. The lesson here is it is better to under promise and over deliver than it is to do the converse.

Who's Kidding Who?

The debate raging over the situation of Iraq is more divorced from reality than it was when Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and claimed that the efforts in Iraq would cost the US far less than $100mm and likely even pay for itself. Let me try to set forward the facts as they stand today: More than 3,000 dead American military personnel; more than 20,000 serious non-lethal American casualties; American public support for American involvement in the Iraqi conflict at its lowest ebb; the Administration and its supporters fervently believe that Iraq must become a sustainable political state; at this point, the Iraqis are incapable of governing and securing a united, inclusive Iraq.

In my view the chances of the Administration regaining the support of the American people for its Iraqi policy - is nil. The dirty little secret is that the Administration is still unable to level with the American people about what it will take to accomplish its goals in Iraq. Irrespective of your position on Iraq, there is no reasonable scenario under which the Administration goals can be accomplished within the next two years. In fact, five years might be the absolute best case scenario. The Iraqis collectively have precious little appetite for the very goals being sold to the American public.

It has been said by a number of political pundits, quite correctly, that the American Administration and the American people can not want this more than the Iraqis. Despite NSC Adviser Hadley's assertions that this plan is the Iraqis plan (and consequently they support it and are willing to make the sacrifices necessary for success), the facts simply do not support that contention. Moreover, the current plan is a single pronged strategy, military without a political component. Thus, even the rosiest conclusion of this initiative is but a beginning.

Given that the administration is not interested in a multi-lateral political solution, what we are left with is a Hobbesian choice, effectively sit back and let the pieces fall where they may or hunker down for what is likely a decade or more or direct involvement in Iraq. The only sustainable argument in support of the later is to operate as a check on the Iranians. In order for that to work it is imperative for the Administration to elevate the perception of the Iranian threat to the US. The President began to lay the groundwork for this political sleight of hand in his speech on Wednesday. The VP, in his remarks on Fox News Sunday fulfilled his role as Administration cudgel by further setting the stage for conflict between the US and Iran by emphasizing its threat to the US.

Note, I stress the threat to the US because I don't believe the Administration can recapture public support if the perceived threat is Israel. The incursion into Iraq on ginned up "intelligence" on the threat posed to the US mainland with its enormous cost in American lives and monies without concomitant success has serious dulled the American public's appetite for war. Thus a casus belli for action against Iran is necessary.

The basis for such action may be found in the upcoming National Intelligence Estimate ("NIE") on Iran that is expected to be completed soon. I expect the Estimate to have much in common with the NIE issued prior to Congress' vote on Iraq, long on descriptions of worst-case scenarios with less ardent views relegated to footnotes or ignored altogether. There has been limited speculation that John Negroponte's reassignment to a less prominent role within the Administration was a precursor to a hawkish Estimate (note, I have a previous post discussing Negroponte's reassignment, interestingly his departure has received precious little attention in the press, overshadowed by the President's revised Iraq strategy).

Finally, I am of the opinion that irrespective of the success new military policy nothing much will change because the Iraqis are not invested in fundamental political change. The Sunnis want to be back in charge, the Shia, even those not interested in direct retribution against the Sunnis, want the spoils of political power and the Kurds want no more than the oil around Kirkuk, relative political autonomy and US protection from the Turks. Until that political landscape changes our efforts in Iraq are a fool's endeavor.

I'm Gonna Listen to My Generals . . .except . . .

when they have the audacity to speak their mind. The well-worn claim by the President that he was following the advice of his generals as it relates to Iraq has been exposed for what it is/was - horse shit.

According to multiple reports, including today's lead in the WaPo, the Joint Chiefs is unanimous in its opposition to President Bush's apparent intent to increase forces in Iraq by 20,000 or more. The Joint Chiefs, seemingly buoyed by the sacking of Donald Rumsfeld, apparently are strenuously opposing the plan to increase US forces in Iraq. Note that Tony Snow deftly attempted to dismiss the story, but he did not go as far as to say the underpinnings of the story were untrue.

The Joint Chiefs' failure to stand up to the authoritarian rule of Rumsfeld has been well documented in books like, State of Denial, Hubris, Chaos and Cobra II. They seem, at least momentarily, empowered by Rummy's sacking. Bush is desperate to prove that despite all data to the contrary, Iraq isn't a lost cause in the short term.

The fact is not only is GWB intellectually lazy, he's intellectually dishonest.

Delay in Bush Iraq Policy Speech - My Take

Official and unofficial sources have squelched the notion that Pres. Bush will issue a major speech prior to Christmas to signal changes to policy in Iraq. The aforementioned speech is now expected early in the new year. My read is that the speech is being delayed for practical political and policy reasons. I expect Bush to accede to the McCain approach, ignored by the Iraqi Strategy Group (because they were told that such an approach was practically a non-starter), and call for a significant increase in troop levels in Iraq. I expect that he may also propose a significant increase in the number of active military personnel.

The President will cite Iraq, Afghanistan and the worldwide threat of terror, but perhaps he could just skip that and offer more succinctly "and you know, yada, yada, yada." Expect to hear the catchphrase of the moment "surrender is not an option," sandwiched with nonsensical claims that leaving Iraq dishonors those soldiers that have died in Iraq, a none to subtle, and well-worn attack on the patriotism of those that may disagree.

Arguments certainly exist as to why out troops should continue to operate in harm's way, but the President is either unwilling or incapable putting forward a compelling and/or honest argument to the American electorate. Instead he continues to petulantly offer the intellectual equivalent of "I fuckin' know better than you - don't you realize I'm the President."

Anyone expecting a more dramatic change in direction are either deluded or simply not paying attention.

Hubris - Initial Thoughts

I'm 150 pages into Isikoff & Corm's book on the run up to the Iraq war, Hubris. On the heels of Woodard's book, differences in style and depth are readily apparent. Hubris is thick with reporting. While I think Woodward's book is a must read for a US policy wonk like me due to his unique access to Administration leadership and the careful sourcing of his reporting, Isikoff and Corn get their hands dirty in the details and it's fascinating. I have some empathy for Isikoff's comments at a press event following the publishing of Woodward's book where he bemoaned all the attention given to State of Denial. Reports had it that Isikoff scoffed at Woodward's book, essentially calling it tired drivel and almost unreadable(he later sought to render those (alcohol-induced?) comments off-the-record with a phone call the next day to no avail).

Based on my reading of Hubris thus far, I have to agree with him. It is a much more detailed account. I'll render a highlight blog on it when I'm done, but q couple of quick hits. In October, 2002 just prior to the vote to authorize force against Iraq, polls showed 52% of Americans supported the notion of going to war against Iraq. I must be developing Alzheimer's, I simply don't recall such a narrow split amongst the populace. It might be that my recollection is influenced by the circles I run in. Morris County, New Jersey bleeds Republican red so there was little doubt regarding the Administration's case for the seriousness of the Iraqi threat. Moreover, my memory also might be dulled because I'm more conscious of the ease with which the authorization passed in Congress. While there was Democratic opposition to the authorization, such opposition was more ceremonial than it was a serious threat. Bully politics - propose divisive, yet often consequential legislation just prior to elections - was effectively utilized to minimize debate and intimidate feckless politicians who stand for little more than job security - their own!

Secondly, Dick Armey, former Congressman from Texas and number two at the time in the House leadership, is apparently a primary source as to the political machinations of the Administration. He is quoted as being deeply troubled regarding his role - effectively silently assenting to an ill-conceived policy constructed upon intel that was far less substantive than the Administration (and the CIA) was leading the public to believe. His mea culpa is that, I should've known better, a position shared by many of the contributors to this book. More to follow.