Who's Kidding Who?

The debate raging over the situation of Iraq is more divorced from reality than it was when Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and claimed that the efforts in Iraq would cost the US far less than $100mm and likely even pay for itself. Let me try to set forward the facts as they stand today: More than 3,000 dead American military personnel; more than 20,000 serious non-lethal American casualties; American public support for American involvement in the Iraqi conflict at its lowest ebb; the Administration and its supporters fervently believe that Iraq must become a sustainable political state; at this point, the Iraqis are incapable of governing and securing a united, inclusive Iraq.

In my view the chances of the Administration regaining the support of the American people for its Iraqi policy - is nil. The dirty little secret is that the Administration is still unable to level with the American people about what it will take to accomplish its goals in Iraq. Irrespective of your position on Iraq, there is no reasonable scenario under which the Administration goals can be accomplished within the next two years. In fact, five years might be the absolute best case scenario. The Iraqis collectively have precious little appetite for the very goals being sold to the American public.

It has been said by a number of political pundits, quite correctly, that the American Administration and the American people can not want this more than the Iraqis. Despite NSC Adviser Hadley's assertions that this plan is the Iraqis plan (and consequently they support it and are willing to make the sacrifices necessary for success), the facts simply do not support that contention. Moreover, the current plan is a single pronged strategy, military without a political component. Thus, even the rosiest conclusion of this initiative is but a beginning.

Given that the administration is not interested in a multi-lateral political solution, what we are left with is a Hobbesian choice, effectively sit back and let the pieces fall where they may or hunker down for what is likely a decade or more or direct involvement in Iraq. The only sustainable argument in support of the later is to operate as a check on the Iranians. In order for that to work it is imperative for the Administration to elevate the perception of the Iranian threat to the US. The President began to lay the groundwork for this political sleight of hand in his speech on Wednesday. The VP, in his remarks on Fox News Sunday fulfilled his role as Administration cudgel by further setting the stage for conflict between the US and Iran by emphasizing its threat to the US.

Note, I stress the threat to the US because I don't believe the Administration can recapture public support if the perceived threat is Israel. The incursion into Iraq on ginned up "intelligence" on the threat posed to the US mainland with its enormous cost in American lives and monies without concomitant success has serious dulled the American public's appetite for war. Thus a casus belli for action against Iran is necessary.

The basis for such action may be found in the upcoming National Intelligence Estimate ("NIE") on Iran that is expected to be completed soon. I expect the Estimate to have much in common with the NIE issued prior to Congress' vote on Iraq, long on descriptions of worst-case scenarios with less ardent views relegated to footnotes or ignored altogether. There has been limited speculation that John Negroponte's reassignment to a less prominent role within the Administration was a precursor to a hawkish Estimate (note, I have a previous post discussing Negroponte's reassignment, interestingly his departure has received precious little attention in the press, overshadowed by the President's revised Iraq strategy).

Finally, I am of the opinion that irrespective of the success new military policy nothing much will change because the Iraqis are not invested in fundamental political change. The Sunnis want to be back in charge, the Shia, even those not interested in direct retribution against the Sunnis, want the spoils of political power and the Kurds want no more than the oil around Kirkuk, relative political autonomy and US protection from the Turks. Until that political landscape changes our efforts in Iraq are a fool's endeavor.